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1 Oil-rich countries typically distribute some resource rents in the form of subsidies
to fuel and other consumer products rather than as universal cash transfers. An
exception, although arguably short-lived, took place recently in Iran (Salehi-Isfahani,
2016). The Iranian program started in 2011 as a relatively large cash transfer (29
percent of median family income) to soften the impact of reducing costly energy
subsidies, but subsequent inflation quickly eroded its real effect.Matthew Berman
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The Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend (PFD) program provides universal basic income (UBI) to all resi-
dents from investment earnings of a state sovereign wealth fund created from oil rents. This paper eval-
uates the effect of the PFD to mitigate poverty among the state’s rural Indigenous (Alaska Native)
peoples: a population with historically high poverty rates living in a region with limited economic oppor-
tunities. Errors in recording PFD income in data used to calculate official poverty statistics cause them to
misrepresent poverty in Alaska and understate the effect of the PFD. Estimating poverty rates with and
without PFD income therefore requires reconstruction of family incomes from household-level data.
Estimated poverty rates from reconstructed income show that the PFD has had a substantial, although
diminishing mitigating effect on poverty for rural Indigenous families. The PFD has had a larger effect
on poverty among children and elders than for the rural Alaska Native population as a whole. Alaska
Native seniors, who receive additional sources of UBI derived primarily from resource rents besides
the PFD, have seen a decline in poverty rates, while poverty rates for children have increased.
Evidence has not appeared for commonly hypothesized potential adverse social and economic conse-
quences of UBI.
 2018 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Universal basic income (UBI) – a cash grant awarded periodically
without conditions – is an old idea (Van Parijs, 2004) that has
attracted new interest in recent years. A number of experiments
are currently underway in Europe, North America, and elsewhere
(Matthews, 2017; Freedman, 2016; Segal, 2016; Kela, no date).Most
UBI initiatives arise in the specific context of poverty alleviation: i.e.,
as a conversion of conditional transfers to unconditional cash pay-
ments (Garcia, Moore, & Moore, 2012). Because recipients are lim-
ited to identified low-income beneficiaries, it is difficult to
evaluate the ability of UBI to reduce the incidence of poverty. Segal
(2011) estimated that converting resource rents to universal cash
transfers could reduce extreme poverty globally by one-fourth to
two-thirds, depending on assumptions used. Despite the potential
for reducing poverty and income inequality, attempts to distribute
even a portion of resource rents in the form of UBI are rare.1The Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend (PFD) program represents
a unique case, in which a significant portion of resource rents has
been distributed as an unconditional cash payment to all residents
annually for several decades. We evaluate the effect of the Alaska
PFD program on poverty alleviation, focusing on the state’s rural
Indigenous people, an economically disadvantaged minority popu-
lation with historically high poverty rates. We begin with a brief
description of the Alaska Permanent Fund and the history of the
PFD, providing the social and political context. Next, we discuss
the problems with the data sources for evaluating poverty in
Alaska, and detail methods for constructing historical household-
level income and poverty data with and without the PFD. Then
we present estimates of poverty rates for the rural Indigenous pop-
ulation over the past 25 years excluding and including PFD income,
and compare these reconstructed estimates to poverty statistics
based on official data. The results include estimates over time for
the overall population, as well as for children and seniors. A discus-
sion section considers the cost of the PFD program, effects on labor
force participation, and other issues raised in the UBI literature.
The conclusion notes the limits of the study and the outlook for
the PFD program.
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2.1. Alaska state resource rents and the Permanent Fund dividend
program
When Alaska gained status as a state in 1959, it was permitted
to acquire 104 million acres (43 million hectares) of unreserved U.
S. public lands (Public Law 85–508, 72 Stat. 339) as well as near-
shore submerged lands granted to other coastal states.2 Fortuitous
land selections and subsequent petroleum discoveries on state-
owned lands provided the relatively small Alaska population an
opportunity to realize resource rents matched by few jurisdictions
worldwide. Citizens voted in 1976 to amend the state constitution
to create the Alaska Permanent Fund as a state sovereign wealth
fund, to save a portion of nonrenewable oil revenues for future pub-
lic needs (Alaska Constitution, Article IX, Section 15). The constitu-
tional amendment allocated at least one-fourth of royalties and
other payments the state realized in its role as resource owner to
the Permanent Fund. In addition, the Alaska Legislature may, and
has appropriated additional revenues to the fund during years when
the state accumulated a large budgetary surplus because of tem-
porarily high oil prices.
In 1980, the Alaska Legislature enacted the PFD program to dis-
tribute a portion of the Permanent Fund earnings to residents. In
addition to satisfying populist demands for sharing the rewards
of publicly owned wealth, the PFD program generated political
support for conservative management of the fund, increasing the
likelihood that the principal would be protected and grow over
time. Annual contributions from oil revenues, combined with rein-
vested earnings enabled the Permanent Fund balance to grow to
nearly $60 billion by July 1, 2017, or approximately $80,000 per
resident. Since 1982, a portion of earnings from the Fund’s invest-
ments has been distributed in equal annual PFD payments uncon-
ditionally to all Alaskans who meet residency requirements.3
Residents send a simple application form with information to verify
residency by mail or internet during the first three months of year.
Awareness of the enrollment deadline is greatly enhanced by media
advertising from non-profit groups alerting potential donors to the
option to donate a portion of their dividend to a designated charita-
ble organization.
One-half the Permanent Fund earnings are reinvested to protect
the principal from the effects of inflation, with the other half avail-
able for dividends. The formula for determining the size of the
annual PFD ties the annual amount to the average of fund earnings
over the previous five years. Although the five-year average
smoothes the PFD somewhat, volatility in the securities markets
and associated Permanent Fund earnings has caused the dividend
to vary substantially over time. Fig. 1 shows the annual PFD
amount since the program’s inception in 1982, along with the per-
centage of per-capita personal income that it represented each
year. The figure shows percentages under two definitions of
income: the U.S. Census Bureau definition and the Bureau of Eco-
nomic Analysis (BEA) definition. The Census Bureau definition rep-
resents self-reported cash income, available for a more limited
time series, for rural Alaska Native people and for the state popu-
lation as a whole. BEA income includes in-kind household receipts
such as employer-provided health care and pension contributions2 The Submerged Lands Act of 1953 (43 U.S. Code § 1301-1356b) awarded all
coastal U.S. states title including mineral rights to subsea lands offshore to three
nautical miles (5.6 km).
3 Generally, eligibility for the PFD requires one calendar year or more of legal
residence, and no more than 180 days absence from the state during the previous
calendar year (see https://pfd.alaska.gov/Eligibility/Requirements). Individuals con-
victed of serious crimes who are sentenced or incarcerated during the year are also
ineligible for that year’s dividend.and imputed rent from owner-occupied dwellings, and is available
every year, but only for the state population as a whole.
As the Permanent Fund and its associated earnings grew over
time, the number of Alaska residents and their incomes increased
as well. Recent PFD payments, although generally larger than those
in earlier years, have lagged inflation, and therefore represent a
smaller percentage of per-capita personal income than during
much of the 1990s.
2.2. Alaska Native people and land claims
According to the 2010 U.S. Census, 138,312 American Indian
and Alaska Native (AIAN) people, the official term for the North
American Indigenous population, resided in the state of Alaska,
constituting about one-sixth of the state population. About half
this total, including 80 percent of the 33,441 reporting a mixed
AIAN and other identity, lived in urbanized areas and are mostly
integrated into the modern economy characteristic of high-
income nations. About 60,000, however, remain in isolated small
communities in rural areas of the Alaska that are not connected
by road to larger population centers. Economic opportunities in
this region are limited. Most of the available jobs are in public
administration or in scattered resource extraction enclaves staffed
with shift workers (Goldsmith, 2007). Few AIAN residents possess
the skills for these jobs, and many continue to practice mixed cash
and subsistence fishing and hunting livelihoods (Wolfe & Walker,
1987).
Persistent economic and social disadvantage for rural AIAN peo-
ple is manifest across a broad range of economic and social indica-
tors. Barely half of working-age adults were employed in 2015, per
capita income was only 52 percent of the national average (Amer-
ican Community Survey data, PUMA 400 region), with the cost of
living much higher (Fried, 2017). Many predominantly Alaska
Native rural school districts show performance on standardized
tests in the bottom 20 percent of schools nationally, and associated
low high school graduation rates (Alaska Department of Education,
no date). Mortality rates for Alaska Natives statewide are 40 per-
cent higher than the state and national averages, driven by injury
death rates 3–4 times the national average (Day, Provost, &
Lanier, 2009). Suicide rates for rural Alaska Native young males
are particularly high (Berman, 2014).
The United States had acquired Russia nearly 100 years earlier
without negotiating treaties with the Indigenous population, lead-
ing to land claims conflicts with the state. The discovery of oil in
1968 on state-selected lands near Prudhoe Bay spurred the U.S.
government to resolve these claims in December 1971 through
the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA) (43 U.S. Code,
section 1601 et seq.). ANCSA awarded mineral rights to 44 million
acres (18 million hectares) of Alaska to 12 regional for-profit cor-
porations owned by Indigenous residents of record at the time of
enactment. Congress attempted to mitigate inequity in regional
resource endowments by adding a clause (section 7(i)) in ANCSA
that required each corporation to share 70 percent of resource rev-
enues with the other regional corporations; yet large wealth dis-
parities remain. Table 1 shows dividends paid annually by each
of the 12 ANCSA regional corporations between 2005 and 2015
to a typical shareholder owning 100 shares of stock.
Ownership of regional corporation shares was originally limited
to beneficiaries enrolled at the end of 1971. The original shares may
only be passed on to others by gift or inheritance. However,
shareholders of several regional corporations have voted over the
years to create additional shares for descendants, with varying rules
for voting rights and payment of dividends. Regional corporations
also distribute additional special dividends of varying amounts to
elders. These complications, combined with the lack of public
information on residence of shareholders, make it impossible to
Fig. 1. Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend as Percentage of Personal Income. Source: Permanent Fund Dividend amount from the Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend Division.
Per-capita income data from U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey and 1990 and 2000 Censuses, and U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Personal Income by State.
Table 1
Annual Dividends per 100 Shares Paid by Alaska Native Regional Corporations, 2005 = 2015.
Year Ahtna Aleut ASRC BSNC BBNC Calista Chugach CIRI Doyon Koniag NANA Sealaska
2005 $ 0 $ 450 $2861 $ 0 $ 800 $ 0 $4,150 $3,100 $ 311 $ 370 $ 381 $ 433
2006 0 500 4,741 0 860 0 4,640 3,100 275 118 700 602
2007 279 0 5,855 0 960 0 5,251 3,393 322 300 1,500 761
2008 279 560 6,110 100 1,100 178 5,030 3,539 356 600 2,475 432
2009 279 600 5,712 100 1,200 211 4,072 3,524 368 873 1,200 215
2010 400 2100 6,426 150 1,280 262 4,192 3,542 421 1,000 1,400 356
2011 202 2000 5,084 235 1,380 313 4,000 3,498 388 1,050 1,470 224
2012 353 500 5,038 235 2,200 342 4,000 3,537 415 1,065 772 221
2013 530 600 11,000 250 2,500 369 4,000 3,499 423 300 772 225
2014 442 700 5,750 300 2,700 519 4,000 3,506 495 300 0 136
2015 443 400 6000 325 3000 581 4000 3651 518 300 600 260
Source: Annual reports filed by Alaska Native Regional Corporations with the Alaska Division of Banking and Securities.
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Indigenous poverty rates. We do address it qualitatively, however.3. Methods
Assessing the effect of the PFD on poverty involves three steps.
First, we decide on an empirical measure to represent the social
construct of poverty. Second, we address data sources that include
information on income distribution by region by race or ethnicity.
Third, we discuss how to distinguish PFD income from other
income in the household data that are available.4 The Census Bureau defines the family for determining poverty status as the set of
related individuals (through blood or marriage) living together in one household. The
official definition of poverty in the United States was developed by the Social Security
Administration to represent a proportion of the family income required to purchase a
survey-based economy food plan. There have been only minor changes in the
definition since 1969, other than to update the thresholds each year based on the
percentage change in the Consumer Price Index. For more information, see Fisher
(1992).3.1. Poverty definition
One may measure poverty with a relative or an absolute indica-
tor. The OECD (2017) uses a relative measure, based on one-half of
median household income. This definition makes poverty synony-
mous with household income disparity. The OECD definition is also
inadequate for evaluating effects of UBI for vulnerable populations,
because it does not account for household composition: specifi-
cally, household size or the presence of children. The United States,on the other hand, uses an absolute measure. The official definition
of poverty used by the U.S. Census Bureau dates from the Johnson
Administration’s ‘‘War on Poverty” initiative in the mid 1960s. Pov-
erty status is determined for a family living together in one house-
hold, based on the ratio of family money income to a threshold
level. The threshold varies according to household size, number
of children in the household, and age of the household head. Differ-
ent poverty thresholds exist for 48 different family configurations
(U.S. Census Bureau, no date).4 Poverty thresholds are adjusted
every year for inflation in proportion to changes in the national Con-
sumer Price Index.
The official poverty rate was 13.5 percent in 2015 for the United
States population as a whole, 19.7 percent for children under 18,
and 8.8 percent for seniors 65 years and older (Proctor, Semega,
5 Four regional corporations – Arctic Slope (ASRC), NANA, Doyon, and Sealaska –
have enrolled descendants. A fifth regional corporation, Calista, has voted to enroll
descendants starting in 2017. In most cases, descendant children of these corpora-
tions receive some benefits at birth, and more benefits at age 18. A fifth regional
corporation, Calista, has voted to enroll descendants starting in 2017.
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family configurations, the U.S. Census poverty definition has a
number of limitations. There has been no attempt to redefine the
index to reflect changes in consumption patterns in the 50 years
since the original thresholds were defined. Although the cost of liv-
ing in rural Alaska communities is typically much higher than in
other U.S. states or even urban Alaska communities (Robinson &
Fried, 2005), the same poverty thresholds are applied to all areas
of the United States. On the other hand, in-kind income is not con-
sidered in the poverty calculation, and many rural Alaskans use
subsistence harvests of country foods for a significant proportion
of their diet (Wolfe & Fischer, 2003). In addition, unmarried part-
ners and children living in the household who are unrelated to
the household head are not considered as family members in pov-
erty calculations.
Any absolute poverty measure is somewhat arbitrary. In this
study, we use the U.S. Census Bureau definition as the primary
metric for evaluating the effects of the Alaska PFD on poverty
because it is so widely used in the United States, However, we do
also consider the effect on poverty rates of the Census Bureau’s
exclusion of unmarried partners from the definition of family.
3.2. Data sources
Household-level data sources for the Alaska population are
extremely limited. The U.S. Census Bureau reports national poverty
statistics using data from the Annual Social and Economic Supple-
ment (ASEC) to the Current Population Survey (CPS). However, the
Alaska sample for the CPS includes only about 1,000 households
per year, with insufficient geographic detail to identify rural house-
holds. Census data, collected since 2005 with the American Com-
munity Survey (ACS), provide the only systematic source of
household data for a large representative sample of Alaskans. The
ACS collects information on race, family relationships, place of res-
idence, income by source, and poverty status from about 8,000
Alaska households annually. In 2000 and previous decadal census
years, the information now collected with the ACS was collected
in conjunction with the population census for a much larger sam-
ple of households. The Census Bureau provides Public Use Micro-
data Samples (PUMS) containing individual and household data
from the ACS as well as from the previous Census Long Form
Surveys.
We obtained Alaska Long-Form Survey PUMS data sets from the
Census Bureau for 1990 and 2000, and ACS annual PUMS data sets
for 2005 through 2015. The Census PUMS data represent a five per-
cent sample of the population: 14,000 Alaska households in 2000
and 10,300 households in 1990. The ACS PUMS data sets represent
much smaller sample sizes, ranging from 2,200 to 2,700 house-
holds per year. However, the combined ACS samples over a five-
year period are similar in size to the Census Long Form data sets.
We also examined Alaska CPS ASEC data sets (Flood, King,
Ruggles, & Warren, 2015) for the last seven years (2010 through
2016), available from the University of Minnesota Population Cen-
ter IPUMS data portal (https://cps.ipums.org/). The CPS ASEC sam-
ple is too small to estimate poverty rates for the rural Alaska Native
population, as mentioned above, but we used it to test how overall
state poverty rates and the effects of the PFD compared to those
derived from the ACS.
The PUMS data sets report place of residence by Public Use
Microdata Areas (PUMAs): a regional geography designed to
ensure anonymity of respondents. Census PUMAS must have at
least 100,000 residents as of the previous decennial census. The
ACS currently has five PUMAs in Alaska, one of which represents
the rural roadless region (PUMA 400), or the ‘‘Subsistence PUMA”
(Fig. 2). The boundaries of the Subsistence PUMA changed slightly
from the 1990 and 2000 definition as a result of the 2010 Census.The CPS ASEC has even more limited geography, reporting only
whether or not the residence is within the Anchorage Metropolitan
Statistical Area. In addition to the PUMS data sets, we obtained the
annual applicable poverty thresholds from the Census Bureau, and
annual statistics on the number of PFD applications, dividends
received, and the dividend amount from the Alaska Permanent
Fund Dividend Division.3.3. Reporting of Alaska Permanent Fund dividend income in Census
Bureau data
The decennial Census Long-Form Surveys, the ACS, and the CPS
ASEC all calculate income as the sum of self-reported income in a
number of categories over the previous 12 months. The PFD is
not mentioned specifically in the questionnaire, and because most
interviews are completed before the PFD is paid out in October,
many respondents apparently forgot to report the previous-year’s
PFD. PFD income could theoretically be included in either one of
the two categories of unearned income: interest, rent and divi-
dends, or ‘‘other income”. Since the annual PFD amount is known,
one may easily discern from the data that most respondents who
did report PFD receipts reported it as ‘‘other income.” The problem
is that only about one-half of Alaska households responding to the
ACS or to the earlier Census Long Form Surveys reported receiving
any ‘‘other income,” and thirty percent reported no one in the
household receiving any of either type of unearned income. Data
from the Alaska CPS ASEC show even lower reported rates of
household unearned income. In contrast, Alaska Permanent Fund
Dividend Division data show that more than 90 percent of the
Alaska population typically receives PFD payments each year.
An additional problem is that neither the ACS nor CPS ASEC
report income of children under 15 years of age, despite the fact
that the PFD is paid to children one year old and older. If parents
were including income of children in their own income, then the
household total unearned income should be positively correlated
with the number of children in the household as well as the num-
ber of adults. We tested this hypothesis by estimating linear
regressions for the amount of household other income and interest,
rent, and dividend income as a function of the number of adults
(age 15 and older in this case), the number of children under 15
in the household, and the age of the respondent for households
reporting positive unearned income, for each year of the ACS and
for the Census Long-Form Surveys in 1990 and 2000. The coeffi-
cients for number of adults in the ‘‘other income” equation was
$300-$400 greater than the annual PFD in each year, and signifi-
cantly different from zero (p < .005), while the coefficients for chil-
dren were effectively zero and insignificant in all years.
Coefficients for the number of children were also always near zero
or negative and statistically insignificant in the equations for inter-
est, rent, and dividend income. Similar equations estimated with
the CPS ASEC data likewise showed no evidence of reporting of
children’s unearned income in income of adults. The evidence
therefore suggests that Census household income data miss PFD
income of children under age 15.
Non-reporting of income of children under 15 also presumably
affects national income and poverty measures calculated from the
Census Bureau data. However, the downward bias is almost cer-
tainly more acute in Alaska than in other states. In addition to
the PFD, which nearly all Alaska children receive, some Alaska
Native corporations have been paying dividends to children.5
Fig. 2. Rural Alaska Region (Subsistence Alaska PUMA). Source: U.S. Census Bureau,
2010 Subsistence PUMA Reference Map (http://www2.census.gov/geo/maps/
dc10map/PUMA_RefMap/st02_ak/puma0200400/DC10PUMA0200400_001.pdf.)
8 To determine the amount of PFD income to remove, we first checked whether
reported ‘‘other income” was between the amount of the previous year’s PFD rounded
down and the amount rounded up to the nearest $100. If so, we removed the amount
of ‘‘other income” reported. If the first test failed, we performed the same test using
interest, rent, and dividends. If that test failed, too, we repeated the procedure using
the current year’s PFD amount. If that test also failed, but the amount of either ‘‘other
income” or interest, rent, and dividends was nevertheless greater than the PFD
threshold, we assumed that the individual had received unearned income in addition
to the PFD. In that case, we estimated income without the PFD by removing the
amount of the previous year’s PFD from reported income.
9 In 2008, the Census Bureau divided the own child relationship type in the ACS
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The information reported in the ACS PUMS is insufficient to be
able to determine missing ANCSA dividend income for children.
However, with minor exceptions, it is possible to determine
whether individuals, including children, were eligible to receive
the PFD.6 Data are not available on dividend applications and
receipts by race. However, 2015 state data showed that the number
of applicants exceeded 98 percent of the total population in rural
Alaska census areas with high Alaska Native populations (ADLWD,
2017). Statewide, 98 percent of 2015 PFD applicants received divi-
dends (Permanent Fund Dividend Division (PFDD), 2016). We there-
fore determined that information on residency and mobility in the
PUMS data were sufficient to estimate presumed PFD receipts, along
with income and associated poverty rates with and without the div-
idend income. The procedure involved four steps.
The ACS PUMS and the 1990 and 2000 Census Long-Form Sur-
vey data include a variable for the ratio of income to the poverty
threshold for each individual living in a household, or in non-
institutional group quarters such as remote work camps and
boarding homes. As a first step, we attempted to replicate the Cen-
sus Bureau’s ratio of family income to the poverty threshold, to
ensure that we could correctly calculate each individual’s poverty
status based on the reported incomes of household members,
age, and relationships to the respondent. We were able to replicate
the reported ratio of family income to the applicable Census
Bureau poverty threshold for each person within a small round-
off error.7
The second step was to determine the amount of PFD income
reported for each individual, and then remove that income to esti-
mate income without the PFD. To determine if PFD income had
been reported, we checked whether either ‘‘other income” or inter-
est, rent, and dividends was less than the current or previous year’s
PFD amount, whichever was smaller, rounded down to the nearest
$100. If neither category of unearned income achieved this thresh-
old, we assumed that PFD income was not reported, and made no
adjustment to estimate income without the PFD. If either ‘‘other
income” or interest, rent, and dividends was equal to or greater
than the PFD amount, and the previous year’s place of residence6 It is possible, for example, that an Alaska resident who reported living in Alaska
one year ago might have been absent from the state for more than 180 days during
the previous year for a reason other than allowable absences, such as military service
or attending college.
7 Income and the poverty ratio in the PUMS are both rounded to protect anonymity
of respondents. The PUMS reports a value of 501 when family income exceeds 500
percent of the poverty threshold.was in Alaska, we assumed that PFD income was included in
reported income, and removed it to estimate income without the
PFD.8
The third step in the analysis was to estimate individual income
including the PFD, by adding the current year’s PFD to the calcu-
lated income without PFD income for all individuals whose
response to the previous place of residence would have qualified
them to receive the PFD. The calculated incomewith the PFD there-
fore differed from reported income for nearly all individuals,
because we included the amount of the current year’s PFD, which
few respondents had yet received, rather than the previous year’s
amount, which some had reported. We determined that the cur-
rent year’s PFD more accurately reflected the effect of the PFD on
poverty status, since the timing of the residence question corre-
sponded closely to the timing of the eligibility period for the cur-
rent rather than the previous year’s PFD. Nearly all eligible
respondents would have received the current year’s PFD in October
of the survey year.
For the final step, we estimated family incomewith and without
the PFD by adding the respective income amounts for related indi-
viduals as per the Census Bureau definition of family. We com-
pared the estimated family income with and without PFD income
to the applicable poverty threshold for that family configuration
for the survey year. As an additional analysis, we also compared
estimated family income with and without PFD income to the pov-
erty threshold for a more inclusive definition of the family that
included unmarried partners. To determine the poverty threshold
applicable to this ‘‘social family” definition, we included the
unmarried partner and his or her children living in the household
as family members, regardless of whether the children were
reported to be related to the respondent.94. Results
Official poverty rates for all Alaska Natives, based on income as
recorded by the Census Bureau, are about 2.5 times the poverty
rate for non-Native Alaskans, and twice the rate for the Alaska pop-
ulation as a whole, (Fig. 3). The Native-non-Native disparity has
persisted as poverty rates drifted upwards after 2000. Reported
poverty rates for Indigenous Alaskans living in rural areas are even
higher: 25 percent in 2011–2015, up from 20.5 percent in 2000.
The estimates shown in Table 2 indicate that Alaska Native poverty
rates in rural Alaska would be especially high without the PFD. On
average over the past eleven years, income without the PFD would
have put over 28 percent of rural Alaska Native people below the
poverty threshold, a slight increase from 27 percent in 1990 andquestionnaire into three subtypes: biological son or daughter, adopted son or
daughter, and stepson or stepdaughter. Children in all three categories were
considered ‘‘related” for the official definition of family for poverty calculations.
Although it is not possible to determine how individual respondents reacted to this
change, it appears that after the stepchild option became available, some respondents
living with unmarried partners who had previously reported the partner’s children as
‘‘unrelated” now reported the same children as stepchildren. To the extent this
occurred, the addition of the stepchild category might have caused official poverty
rates to show a slight increase after 2007. Our calculated ‘‘social family” poverty rate
would not be affected by the change in reporting, however.
*  based on 1989 income 
** based on 1999 income 
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Fig. 3. Percentage of Alaska Population with Income Below the Poverty Threshold: Income as Reported. Source: Estimated from US Census and American Community Survey
PUMS data.
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poverty rates were 22 percent, up from 14 percent in 2000.10
Clearly, the PFD has substantially mitigated poverty rates
among rural Alaska Natives. However, its ability to mitigate pov-
erty for this vulnerable population has been declining in recent
years. Fig. 4 illustrates how the ameliorating effect of the PFD
has declined as poverty rates based on income excluding the PFD
have increased. In 2000, the PFD lifted 12.4 percent of the rural
Alaska Native population out of poverty, a 46 percent reduction
in the population in poverty without the PFD. By 2011–2015, these
figures had fallen to 6.1 percent of the population, or 22 percent of
the population in poverty excluding PFD income.
Table 3 shows the effect of the PFD on rural Alaska Native pov-
erty rates separately by household type. The results for households
without children exhibit smaller corrections from misreporting of
PFD income compared to the results for households with children,
highlighting the effects of the omission of children’s income in the
official statistics. Poverty rates rose in single-person households
while declining in multiple-adult households, mainly due to
increased labor-force participation and earnings among married
rural Alaska Native women. The figures illustrate both the high
poverty rates among single-parent families excluding PFD income,
and the diminishing ability of the PFD to mitigate these high rates
in the more recent years.
The results by household type in Table 3 suggest that pattern
of change has not been uniform across the rural Alaska Native
population; in particular, trends for seniors and children have10 Sampling error confidence intervals for these poverty figures cannot be computed
directly, but may be estimated from published 90% margins of error for the number of
persons in poverty on which they are based (U.S. Census Bureau, 2002, 2016). Based
on the published figures, the estimated 90 percent margin of errors for poverty rates
with and without PFD income for all rural AIAN people are 0.8 percent in 1990 and
2000, 1.5 percent for 2005–2010, and 1.6 percent for 2011–2015. Estimated margins
of error for child poverty rates are similar, with elder poverty rates somewhat smaller.diverged. Poverty rates for Alaska Native seniors have declined
dramatically since 1990. Considering only non-PFD income, pov-
erty rates for rural Alaska Natives age 65 or older would have fal-
len by nearly 50 percent over this period. Including PFD income,
the decline was even larger, from 20.1 percent to 7.6 percent, or
59 percent (Fig. 5). If the PFD were eliminated, poverty rates for
rural Alaska Natives age 65 and older would increase by 72
percent.
Rural Alaska Native children show the opposite trend (Fig. 6).
Excluding PFD income, poverty rates for rural AIAN children were
essentially unchanged between 1990 and 2000, but would have
risen four percent since 2000, to nearly one-third of the population.
Taking estimated PFD income properly into account, child poverty
rates increased by 11.5 percent since 2000, an 86 percent rise. In
2000, the PFD was very effective in mitigating poverty among
Alaska Native children, reducing poverty rates by more than half.
It has been increasingly ineffective since then, however, enabling
only a 25 percent reduction in 2011–2015.11 Poverty trends shown
in Table 2 for the working-age population are similar to those for
children, but show a more muted rise since 2000. The PFD reduces
poverty by less for working-age rural Alaska Natives than for chil-
dren and seniors, because earnings represent a much larger share
of income for this group, even among the poor.
Another way to gauge the effect of the PFD on rural Indigenous
poverty is to measure its effect on the depth of poverty. The U.S.
Census Bureau defines ‘‘deep poverty” as family income less than
one-half the poverty threshold (Proctor et al., 2016). Using this def-
inition, Table 2 shows that the PFD reduced deep poverty among
rural Alaska Natives from 13.1 percent to 8.1 percent (38%) in
the period 2011–2015. The PFD’s effectiveness in mitigating deep11 One should note that the 24.8 percent average poverty rate that we estimated
over the past five years is five percentage points lower that the rate based on income
reported in Census Bureau data. So while child poverty rates have indeed been rising
in Alaska, reported rates are overstated.
Table 2
Alaska Poverty Rates: Reported Rates and Estimated Rates With and Without Permanent Fund Dividend Income.
1990a 2000b 2005-2010c 2011-2015c
All Alaska residents
Income as reported 7.6% 8.9% 9.6% 10.3%
Excluding PFD income 8.7% 10.6% 11.0% 11.4%
Including all PFD income 6.7% 6.4% 8.6% 9.1%
All Alaska AIAN residents
Income as reported 19.1% 17.8% 18.5% 20.1%
Excluding PFD income 23.2% 22.4% 22.3% 22.5%
Including all PFD income 14.1% 12.6% 16.3% 17.2%
Rural AIAN residents
Income as reported 22.2% 20.5% 22.8% 25.2%
Excluding PFD income 27.3% 26.7% 28.4% 28.3%
Including all PFD income 20.4% 14.3% 19.9% 22.2%
Rural AIAN children under age 18
Income as reported 23.9% 22.0% 25.7% 29.8%
Excluding PFD income 29.1% 28.9% 32.2% 32.9%
Including all PFD income 21.0% 13.3% 21.0% 24.8%
Rural AIAN adults age 18–64
Income as reported 21.0% 20.2% 22.5% 24.0%
Excluding PFD income 26.0% 25.6% 27.3% 27.3%
Including all PFD income 18.7% 15.4% 20.4% 22.4%
Rural AIAN elders age 65 and older
Income as reported 20.6% 13.3% 11.5% 9.7%
Excluding PFD income 26.1% 19.7% 16.8% 13.3%
Including all PFD income 20.1% 11.0% 9.6% 7.6%
Deep poverty, Rural Alaska AIAN residents
Income as reported 9.3% 7.1% 8.4% 10.4%
Excluding PFD income 12.3% 11.7% 12.1% 13.4%
Including all PFD income 6.8% 3.5% 6.2% 8.1%
a 1990 Census poverty rates based on 1989 income and poverty thresholds.
b 2000 Census poverty rates based on 1999 income and poverty thresholds.
c Estimated from the American Community Survey Public Use Microdata Samples.
*  based on 1989 income 
** based on 1999 income 
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Fig. 4. Rural Alaska Native Poverty Rates: Reported Rate and Estimated Rate Including and Excluding PFD Income. Source: Estimated from US Census and American
Community Survey PUMS data.
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the rural Indigenous population remained in deep poverty, a 70
percent reduction from 11.7 percent without the PFD.An important demographic trend in the United States – an
increase in unmarried partner households with children – could
have a significant effect on poverty rates over time. As mentioned
Table 3
Rural Alaska Native Poverty Rates by Household Type: Reported Rates and Estimated Rates With and Without Permanent Fund Dividend Income.
1990a 2000b 2005-2010c 2011-2015c
Single-person househods
Income as reported 26.2% 29.5% 30.0% 29.8%
Excluding PFD income 28.2% 34.6% 34.7% 33.3%
Including all PFD income 25.7% 29.4% 29.7% 29.6%
Households with multiple adults, no children
Income as reported 16.5% 14.3% 13.8% 11.9%
Excluding PFD income 20.7% 20.9% 17.5% 14.3%
Including all PFD income 16.5% 12.0% 13.1% 11.5%
Households with one adult and children
Income as reported 30.4% 40.0% 29.5% 37.2%
Excluding PFD income 32.6% 43.8% 34.4% 38.2%
Including all PFD income 20.9% 23.3% 26.5% 31.3%
Households with multiple adults and children
Income as reported 22.8% 20.1% 24.1% 27.2%
Excluding PFD income 28.6% 26.3% 30.3% 30.7%
Including all PFD income 18.1% 12.8% 20.3% 23.5%
a 1990 Census poverty rates based on 1989 income and poverty thresholds.
b 2000 Census poverty rates based on 1999 income and poverty thresholds.
c Estimated from the American Community Survey Public Use Microdata Samples.
*  based on 1989 income 
** based on 1999 income 
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Fig. 5. Poverty Rates for Rural Alaska Native Seniors: Reported Rate, and Estimated Rate Including and Excluding PFD Income. Source: Estimated from US Census and
American Community Survey PUMS data.
168 M. Berman /World Development 106 (2018) 161–172above, the official U.S. poverty definition excludes unmarried part-
ners when calculating the poverty status of families. The official
poverty definition dates from the 1960s and has not been revised
since, beyond cost of living adjustments. At that time, unmarried
partner households with children were so rare in the United States
that the Census Bureau did not attempt to ascertain their numbers.
However, the number of children living in unmarried partner
households has been rising steadily over the last several decades.
By 2010, U.S. Census data for Alaska show that 15 percent of all
intimate partner households were unmarried partner households,
the majority of which had children under 18 living with them.
Among the Alaska Native population, the ratio of children living
in married partner households to those living in unmarried partner
households declined from more than six to one in 1990, to three to
one in 2011–2015.Including unmarried partners as family members in the defini-
tion of poverty could either raise or lower poverty rates, depending
on the income of the unmarried partners, and whether they also
have children living in the household who the survey respondent
reports as related to the householder. In the case of the rural Alaska
Native population, including unmarried partners in the family sig-
nificantly reduces calculated poverty rates. Table 4 reveals that
revising the definition of the family to include unmarried partners
and their children eliminates the upward trend since 2000 in rural
Alaska poverty rates excluding PFD income, and cuts in half the
increase in the rate for rural AIAN children. When PFD income is
included, rural Alaska Native poverty rates with the revised family
definition still rise substantially. However, poverty rates for chil-
dren and for the rural AIAN population as a whole are both more
than four percentage points lower when unmarried partners are
*  based on 1989 income 
** based on 1999 income 
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Fig. 6. Poverty Rates for Rural Alaska Native Children: Reported Rate, and Estimated Rate Including and Excluding PFD Income. Source: Estimated from US Census and
American Community Survey PUMS data.
Table 4
Estimated Rural Alaska Native Poverty Rates With and Without Permanent Fund Dividend Income, Unmarried Partners Included as Family Members.
1990a 2000b 2005–2010c 2011–2015c
All Rural AIAN residents
Excluding PFD income 25.4% 24.9% 26.7% 24.4%
Including all PFD income 18.0% 12.2% 18.4% 17.8%
Rural AIAN children under age 18
Excluding PFD income 26.8% 26.9% 28.4% 28.8%
Including all PFD income 18.6% 11.2% 18.8% 20.6%
a 1990 Census poverty rates based on 1989 income.
b 2000 Census poverty rates based on 1999 income.
c Estimated from the American Community Survey Public Use Microdata Sample.
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rural Alaska Natives in poverty by 27 percent, and the percentage
of AIAN children by 28 percent. Revising the poverty definition to
include unmarried partners as family members would substan-
tially reduce poverty rates for non-Native Alaskans, too, but the
effect is stronger for Alaska Native families, who have a higher pro-
portion of children living in unmarried partner households.
5. Discussion
We found that poverty rates in Alaska based on reported
income are biased upward, due to systematic underreporting of
PFD income among adults, and non-reporting of income to children
under age 15. The degree that underreporting of PFD income in
census data biases poverty rates depends on the distribution of
family income as well as the size of the PFD. In 2000, the PFD
reduced the number of rural Alaska Native people living in poverty
by 46 percent. Although the PFD represented a somewhat larger
share of per-capita income in 2000, more people were living close
to the poverty threshold then as well, so a relatively small incre-ment in income had a big effect on poverty rates. Since 2000, the
effectiveness of the PFD in reducing poverty rates has declined
both because the PFD has declined as a percentage of personal
income, and because incomes without the PFD have fallen farther
below the poverty threshold for more families. A major contribut-
ing factor to the latter trend is the increase in unmarried partner
households, especially those with children. The official U.S. poverty
definition does not count unmarried partners as family members. If
unmarried partners were considered as family members for pov-
erty calculations, a PFD amount slightly higher than that in recent
years – to the real amount distributed in 2000 – would still cut
poverty rates by nearly one-half.
We found that poverty rates for Alaska Native seniors have
overwhelmingly declined over the past 25 years. The PFD played
a significant part in that decline. Dividends and additional pay-
ments by ANCSA corporations to elder shareholders represent
another form of UBI available to many Alaska Native seniors that
contributed to the observed poverty reduction. Supplemental pay-
ments to elders vary among the corporations and over the years,
and come in the form of special stock, special dividends, and
170 M. Berman /World Development 106 (2018) 161–172payments from elders benefit trust funds.12 Information in the ACS
is insufficient to determine which seniors are shareholders of which
ANCSA corporations, making a quantitative estimate of the effect of
ANCSA payments infeasible.
The uneven performance of ANCSA regional corporations and
associated dividend disparities shown in Table 1 bears similarities
to the experience of AIAN people living on reservations in other U.
S. states. Two main sources of basic income available to AIAN
reservation residents are dividends from earnings of tribal casino
operations, and lease revenues from minerals, agriculture, or real
estate development of tribal or other lands held in trust by the fed-
eral government. The U.S. Department of the Interior, which man-
ages mineral lease revenues, paid $560.4 million to tribes and
allottees in 2016 (USDI, no date). Most likely went to a few tribes
with active oil leases, but the amount individual tribes received
is confidential. Historical mismanagement of trust accounts by
the federal government has led to a series of legal settlements
involving some large cash payments, but nothing comparable to
UBI.13
Reservation gambling casinos involve much larger sums: gross
receipts exceeded $30 billion in 2016, with 84 casinos grossing
more than $100 million each (NIGC, no date). Profitable casinos
may distribute cash dividends to tribal members if they have a fed-
erally approved distribution plan, although only tribes with smal-
ler membership generally do so. Unlike the PFD, most tribes do not
distribute casino earnings directly to children, but rather hold
them in trust until age 18 (Taggart & Conner, 2011; Cornell et al.,
2008). Overall, the evidence shows that gaming has had broadly
positive effects on tribes (Akee, Spilde, & Taylor, 2015). However,
effects of basic income from distributions from successful casino
operations are confounded by much larger effects of the employ-
ment opportunities casinos generate. For example, Evans and
Topoleski (2002) found that employment increased by 26 percent
in reservations 4 years after casinos opened there. Large disparities
in casino earnings, often due simply to a favorable location near
population centers, are analogous to the disparities noted for
ANCSA regional corporation dividends: some tribes have undoubt-
edly realized large benefits, but many have seen little impact on
poverty reduction. Even considering the recent rise in poverty
rates, the PFD has reduced Alaska Native poverty considerably
below the average for AIAN reservation residents reported by
Akee et al. (2015), especially for children.
UBI skeptics have raised a number of concerns about unin-
tended consequences. These include reduction in labor force par-
ticipation, increased purchase ‘‘temptation goods” such as alcohol
and drugs, family dissolution, and the sheer cost of financing the12 Nine of the twelve ANCSA regional corporations publicly disclosed additional
elder payments of some kind in the past year, as follows. Doyon: twice the dividend
upon reaching age 65. (https://www.doyon.com/our-shareholders/records-stocks/s-
tock-classes/); NANA: elders trust started in 2008 distributed a $1,000 dividend in
2016 (http://nana.com/regional/news-and-press/press-releases/nana-elders-settle-
ment-trust-announces-2016-distribution/); ASRC: Elders Benefit Trust pays out
monthly checks of an unspecified amount to original ASRC shareholders 65 and
older (https://www.asrc.com/About/History/Pages/1990toPresent.aspx); CIRI: CIRI
Elders’ Settlement Trust: $450 per year (http://www.ciri.com/shareholders/bene-
fits/dividends-and-distributions/distribution-schedule/); Bering Straits Regional Cor-
poration: $750 (double dividend) for elders in 2017 (http://beringstraits.com/bsnc-
declares-special-elders-dividend-distribution-3/); Ahtna: $400 elder dividend in 2016
(http://ahtna-Inc.com/ahtna-declares-largest-shareholder-dividend-in-10-years/);
Bristol Bay Native Corporation: $500 elder dividend in 2016 (www.bbnc.net/bbnc-
2016-tax-information/); Aleut: $550 Elder Benefit in 2017 (http://www.aleut-
corp.com/2017-dividend-schedule/); Sealaska: Owners of elder stock received $133
for the first quarter of 2017 (https://www.sealaska.com/news/item/2017-03-31/
sealaska-announces-2017-spring-distribution).
13 The largest such lawsuit, the Cobell case, was settled in 2009 for $3.4 billion.
(Class Action Settlement Agreement, December 7, 2009. Elouise Pepion Cobell, et al., vs.
Ken Salazar, Secretary of the Interior, et al. Case 1:96-cv-01,285-TFH Document 3660-
2 , Filed 12/10/10 in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.)payments. Earlier claims that the U.S. negative income tax experi-
ments in the 1960s had caused an increase in the divorce rate were
refuted by Cain and Wissoker (1990). Forget (2011) likewise found
no increase in family dissolution rates or increase in fertility in a
1974–1979 Canadian field experiment.
Much of the academic literature critically evaluating UBI pro-
grams focuses on potential effects on labor supply. While inconclu-
sive, this literature finds relatively weak evidence for adverse labor
supply effects. For example, Skoufias and di Maro (2006) found
that the Mexico Oportunidades program had no significant impact
on labor supply. Widerquist (2005) reviewed the literature on early
UBI experiments in the U.S. and Canada, concluding that the evi-
dence showed that concerns about depressing effects on labor sup-
ply have been exaggerated. Observed reduction in work hours was
greatest for youth and for married women. For the latter group,
reduction in work outside the home was likely offset by increased
household production. For youth, higher school attendance and
staying in school longer yield potentially large future returns on
the investment in human capital. A DFID (2011) report found that
the benefits in terms of higher earnings due to use of a portion of
the increased income for investment in higher learning exceeded
the cost of a Canadian UBI experiment. Other studies have found
positive effects of UBI programs on school attendance and perfor-
mance in poorer countries, including India (Standing, 2013), South
Africa (Case, Hosegood, & Lund, 2003; Samson et al., 2004), and
Malawi (Miller, Tsoka, & Reichert, 2006).
The Alaska PFD differs from the UBI welfare experiments with
respect to its potential effects on labor supply in that participation
in the PFD program does not reduce incremental earnings from
work at any income level. The PFD therefore has an income effect
but no substitution effect.14 The closest analogy to the PFD is the
universal cash transfer program that Iran implemented to mitigate
the effects of reduced energy subsidies following the imposition of
international sanctions in 2011. Salehi-Isfahani and Mostafavi-
Dehzooei (2017) found no evidence that this program reduced labor
supply except for youth, many of whom likely gained additional edu-
cation and training. On the other hand, they found that service sector
workers increased work hours, speculating that some used the trans-
fers to expand their businesses. A formal statistical investigation of
the effect of the Alaska PFD on labor supply would be challenging,
because there is no control group. The program has been in place
for 35 years, and everyone is eligible to receive the PFD except newly
arrived in-migrants, who obviously differ from longer-term resi-
dents. A simple test – comparing labor force participation in Alaska
to that of other states – reveals that both the labor force participa-
tion rate and the employment rate (ratio of the employed to the pop-
ulation) are higher in Alaska than in the United States as a whole.
Some of the observed difference may derive from a larger proportion
of youth attending college outside Alaska and older persons leaving
the state after retirement. However, Census data show that the
Alaska labor force participation and the employment rates are higher
than the national averages for both men and women in every age
group, despite the scarcity of job opportunities in many rural areas
of the state.
A World Bank report (Evans & Popova, 2014) reviewed evidence
from multiple studies of another potential adverse effect of UBI –
that the extra income would be used for temptation goods and
not actually improve well-being – finding little evidence for that
hypothesis. Most Alaskans receive their PFD in early to mid Octo-
ber, although the amount of the year’s PFD is known as much as
six months in advance. Monthly state alcohol tax data for October
show only a continuation of the seasonal decline as the summer14 Technically, there is the possibility of a reduction in the incremental income from
work if an individual moves into a higher marginal income tax rate as a consequence
of receiving the PFD.
M. Berman /World Development 106 (2018) 161–172 171tourist season winds down in the fall. A 2011 expenditure survey
reported that only 23 percent of Alaska households said they
would spend any of their PFD on new purchases; most would
use it to pay bills or save it (Northern Economics, 2011). Hsieh
(2003) similarly found no statistically significant differences
between Alaska households and households in the other 49 states
in quarterly durable or nondurable consumption patterns, but did
find that debt balances decreased and savings balances increased
more in the fourth quarter. This suggests that residents treat the
PFD as permanent rather than windfall income.
Since the entire Alaska resident population receives the PFD, it
is much more costly than programs with a need-based eligibility
requirement. In 2015, the PFD constituted 3.7 percent of state per-
sonal income.15 However, although Alaska has no state income tax,
progressive federal income taxes recapture a portion of the PFD pay-
ment from more well-off individuals. A recent study estimated that
federal income taxes collect 16 percent of PFD receipts on average,
rising to 31 percent for the richest 10 percent of households
(Knapp, Berman, & Guettabi, 2016). The fact that everyone receives
the benefit also allowed the PFD to easily overcome the political
obstacles that have arisen elsewhere to funding UBI programs.
Accounting for the cost simply in terms of the gross payout ignores
any potential reduction in state welfare expenditures for the poor, or
improvements in productivity and savings in health care costs aris-
ing from improved physical and mental health, as found by Forget
(2011).16 By far the largest state expenditure that directly benefits the poor consists of6. Conclusion
The Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend program represents a
unique case of a sovereign wealth fund being used to provide uni-
versal basic income to the population. Although the entire resident
population receives the PFD, its income maintenance properties
strongly affect low-income households, especially families with
children. After adjusting U.S. Census data for errors in reported
income, we found that the Alaska PFD has been highly effective
in reducing high poverty rates among the state’s rural Indigenous
people. The PFD has not eliminated poverty, however: it represents
‘‘partial” rather than ‘‘full” Universal Basic Income. Furthermore, its
effectiveness has declined: from a 46 percent reduction in the
number of Alaska Natives below the poverty income threshold in
2000 to 22 percent between 2011 and 2015.
The poverty-reducing effects of the PFD for rural Alaska Natives
have been most pronounced for the elderly. Poverty rates for rural
Alaska Native seniors have declined substantially since 1990 due
in large part to other sources of resource-rent-derived UBI from
Indigenous land claims. Nevertheless, the PFD reduced rural Alaska
Native elder poverty rates in2011–2015byanadditional 40percent.
Child poverty rates have been increasing in Alaska as well as in the
United States as a whole. However, the PFD reduced rural Alaska
Native child 2011–2015 poverty rates by one-quarter, and by nearly
30% if unmarried partners were counted as family members.
It is difficult to test whether the PFD has caused adverse social
and economic effects, because the program has been in effect for
35 years and all residents are eligible to receive it. We found no
evidence, however, that the program has had any significant
long-term adverse effects on labor force participation or spending
patterns. The Alaska PFD was not designed as a poverty-reduction
measure, but rather as a populist program to share the state’s
resource wealth with citizens. Nevertheless, its equal per-capita
(taxable) payments amounted to a progressive transfer that has
significantly mitigated poverty, especially among Alaska’s vulnera-
ble rural Indigenous population. As current and future state budget15 Based on U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis State Personal Income Estimates.challenges lead to a reduction in PFD distributions to permit the
Fund’s earnings to be applied to support provision of public ser-
vices, poverty rates in Alaska are almost certain to rise.16 If errors
in income recording by the U.S. Census Bureau are not corrected,
official statistics on poverty rates will understate the actual increase
in poverty.
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